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IN THE SUPREME COURT
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAHf
Plainti ff-Respondent,
Case No. CR 86-0112
Category No. 2

v.
THOMAS M. SPEER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Thomas M. Speerf appeals from the conviction
of the crime of aggravated burglary and aggravated assault, and
the denial of the Defendant's motion for a new trial following
said conviction.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant

was tried

before

the Honorable

Judge

J. Dennis Frederick and convicted by a jury on April 25, 1985.
He was committed to the Utah State Prison on May, 20, 1985, but
granted a stay of commitment pending his Motion for New Trial.
The Motion for New Trial was heard and denied on January 8, 1986.
The Defendant filed his appeal from the denial of his motion on
January 30, 1986.

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant

seeks to have his convictions of

aggravated burglary and aggravated assault vacated and to have
the matter remanded for new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At

the

time

of the

alleged

crime, Appellant

was

estranged from his wife Sharon Speer, Complainant in this matter,
the two were living apart, and involved in a divorce proceeding.
Following the departure of the Speerfs children to
school on February 13, 1985, the Appellant came to the residence
of Sharon

Speer.

He had

in his possession

a shotgun. He

indicated that he and Mrs. Speer were "going to spend the day
together".

Evidence at trial indicated that Mr. Speer intended

to commit suicide, and the gun was for this purpose.
During the time that Mr. Speer occupied the house with
Mrs. Speer, several struggles between the two ensued.

Mrs. Speer

testified that Mr. Speer had grabbed her and yanked her hair and
choked and assaulted her, but had not utilized a weapon in any of
these acts.

Mr. Speer was finally taken into custody following a

call from a friend of Mrs. Speer's who became concerned and
called the police.

Upon the arrival of the police, Mr. Speer was

taken into custody without incident.

Mrs. Speer was not injured.

The Defendant was bound over to the District Court and
arraigned before the Honorable Timothy Hanson.

A request for

bail was denied by Judge Hanson on April 17 and the matter was

set for a trial date of April 23.

On April 23, this matter was

heard by the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick.

No Order changing

the Judge assignment or continuing the trial was made on the
record.
At trial, Mr. Speer took the stand as a witness during
the defense phase.

In response to cross-examination questions

from Counsel for the State, the

Defendant denied that he hated

his son Eric, that the Defendant had threatened to kill Eric if
he ever stood up to Mr. Speer again, or that he had threatened to
kill Eric or his mother. (Transcript of Criminal Proceedings,
April 24 and 25, 1985, at pp. 30, 33, 47-48.

Hereinafter

ff

T.R.ff)

Mr. Speer also testified that he had not threatened or physically
harmed his sons.

Id.

Upon the Prosecution's asking the Defendant if his
discipline of his sons included breaking their arms, counsel for
the Defendant objected and the Court sustained the objection.
T.R. at 48.

Eric Speer and Erron Speer, the Defendant's sons,

and Stacey Lee Speer, the Defendant's daughter, were later called
as rebuttal witnesses.
concerning
Defendant's

Mr.

Speer's

counsel

Both Eric and Erron were questioned
alleged

physical

tv/ice objected

abuse

of them.

to the questions

as

collateral, but the Court overruled both objections, stating that
the questions went to the credibility of the Defendant who denied
physically abusing either of his sons.

T.R. at 181, 193.

At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, the
jury was instructed
aggravated
kidnapping.

on the offenses of aggravated assault;

kidnapping,

aggravated

No instruction

burglary,

burglary

and

on simple assault as a lesser

included offense to aggravated assault was given to the jury, A
verdict of guilty was subsequently entered as to the charges of
aggravated burglary and aggravated assault, and a verdict of not
guilty was rendered as to kidnapping.
At

the

time

of

sentencing,

the

Court

enhanced

Defendant's sentence by one year in accordance with Section 76-3203, Utah Code Ann. (1953).
The Defendant was originally charged in two cases:

the

above referenced matter; and a less serious matter in which the
Defendant was charged with having entered the home of his then
estranged wife and destroying her clothing.

The second matter

was set for trial first and would have been resolved before the
trial in this case.

However,

the matter was continued by mutual

agreement of counsel for the reason that both felt trial in the
instant matter would be dispositive of the second matter.

The

Defendant himself did not participate in such stipulation for
indefinite continuance of the second matter, and learned of the
continuance only after the fact.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMFNT
Defendant Thomas Speer asserts six points of error in
his appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial.

These

six points of error - the allowance of improper and highly
prejudicial impeachment testimony; the Trial Court's violation of
its own rules and procedures in reassigning the case; denial of
effective

assistance

of counsel; failure to give a lesser

included offense jury instruction;

prosecutorial misconduct; and

erroneous jury instruction on intent required for conviction individually and collectively establish that the Defendant was
denied a fair and impartial trial on the charges of aggravated
assault

and

kidnapping.

Such

errors

were

prejudicial

to

Mr. Speer's defense in that a different verdict would likely have
resulted had the errors not occurred.
ARGUMENT
I.

HIGHLY

PREJUDICIAL AND IMPROPER IMPEACHMENT
TESTIMONY WAS ALLOWED

The general rule of evidence, as followed by this
Court, is that the answers of a witness upon cross examination on
any irrelevant or collateral matter is conclusive and binding,
and the witness may not be contradicted or impeached upon any
immaterial or collateral matter or issue.
571

State v. Mitchell,

P.2d 1351, 1355 (Utah 1977), citing Davenport v. State,

P.2d 452, 454 (Ala. 1974);

519

State v. Jiron. 489 P.2d 109 (1971).

Neither is it permissible to impeach the credibility of
a witness by injecting irrelevant and immaterial issues and then
contradicting
P. 652.

them

thereon.

98 C.J.S. Witnesses,

Section

633

Even though credibility of all witnesses is an issue,

specific incidents relating to character and not related to the
matter in evidence may not be used as the basis for impeachment.
Bullock v. Ungricht, 538 P.2d 190 (1975); Utah Rules of Evidence,
Rule 608(b) ("Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for
the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other
than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be
proved by extrinsic evidence.")
Thus, the cross-examiner

is denied the use of other

witnesses or the offering of extrinsic evidence to contradict
this

type

of testimony.

State v. Jiron, 489 P.2d

109

(1971);

State v. Harp. 534 P.2d 46 (Wash. 1975).
Whether a matter pursued for the purpose of impeachment
is irrelevant or collateral turns on whether the fact could have
been

shown

in

evidence

for

any

purpose

independent

contradiction, i.e., whether the cross-questioning

of

party would

have been entitled to prove the matter as part of his case in

chief.

public service co,rof Oklahoma v, Bleak, 656 P.2d

612 (Ariz. 1982).

600,

2 Wharton's Criminal Evidence Sec. 467.

The State's case in chief against Mr. Speer was based
upon alleged

kidnapping, burglary and assault

Mrs. Speer on February 13, 1985.
the children were not present.

committed on

During the alleged incident,
Furthermore, the alleged prior

physical abuse of Eric and Erron Speer by the Defendant did not
constitute a matter which the State would have been entitled to

prove as a part of it's case in chief.

Consequently, the

testimony of Eric and Erron Speer was on a collateral matterr not
a proper matter for impeachment.
* * * when impeaching a witness the relevancy
of the impeaching evidence must be clear, must
not raise collateral issues and must be
directed only at the witness1 credibility and
not at the witness 1 moral character,
(Citation omitted).
Here the evidence adduced * * * was irrelevant
to * * * the offense [he] was charged with.
People v. Diaz, 644 P.2d 71 (Colo. 1982).
Where evidence which is irrelevant or collateral to the
issues in controversy is admitted and has a tendency to prejudice
the trier-of-fact, such error is fatal to a conviction.

This

rule applies even though there might of been sufficient relevant
evidence

to sustain the verdict. 1 Wharton's

Criminal

Evidence

Sec. 164.
The nature of the testimony of Eric and Erron Speer was
highly prejudicial to the Defendant.

The issues in controversy-

concerned an assault charge, and the testimony of Eric and Erron
Speer concerned threats of assault by the Defendant upon third
persons and may have lead the jury to think the Defendant more
likely to have committed the assaultive conduct claimed.
Furthermore, the charges of child abuse are per se
inflammatory and have a prejudicial tendency.
Consequently, the admission of the testimony by Eric
and Erron Speer constituted reversible error.

II.

THE COURT VIOLATED ITS OWN RULES AND PROCEDURES IN
CHANGING JUDGES WITHOUT A HEARING OR COURT ORDER
After being bound over to the District Court, this case

was originally assigned to the Honorable Timothy Hansen, one of
the Judges of the Third District Court.

On April 17, 1985, Judge

Hansen entered an order denying bail and setting the trial date.
Pre-trial motions by the Defendant were heard and ruled upon by
Judge Hansen, including a motion for the Defendant's release to
pretrial services.

Judge Hanson rendered his ruling on this

motion only six days prior to the trial.
trial was called
Fredericks presided.

Yet when the scheduled

before the Third District

Court, Judge

No order changing the Judge assignment or

continuing the trial appears in the record.
Rule 3.4 of the Rules of Practice in District Courts
provides in part:
(b) Criminal cases that have been set for trial
or hearing shall not be continued or reassigned
except upon order of the court.
The Defendant, in a series of pro se motions, has
challenged

the bias of the Honorable

(Record on Appeal at 137-38, 198-200.)

J. Dennis

Frederick.

With no order reassigning

the case, it should have stayed before Judge Hansen and should
not have been reassigned without the opportunity of the Defendant
to be heard on the subject.

To do so was a denial of due process

and should result in a new trial before the properly assigned
Judge.

III.

DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
IN THAT DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL DISREGARDED DEFENDANT'S
DIRECTIONS IN PREPARING HIS DEFENSE
Disciplinary

Rule

7-101

of

the

Code

of

Professional

Ethics for the Utah State Bar Association provides in part:
(A)

A lawyer shall not intentionally,
(1) fail to seek the lawful objectives
of his client through
reasonably
available means permitted by law and
these disciplinary rules except as
provided by Disciplinary Rule 7 - 1 0 K B ) .
•

«

• •

(3) Prejudice or damage his client
during the course of the professional
relationship except as required under
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B).
(B)

in his representation of a client, a lawyer may:
(1) Where permissible, exercise his
professional judgment 'to waive or fail
to assert a right or position of his
client.

Section 78-51-26(9) Utah Code Ann. (1953) requires all
attorneys
including

to

comply

with

its Disciplinary

the

rules

of the

Utah

State

Bar,

Rules as enacted by the Association

and Approved by the Utah Supreme Court.
These

rules, in

effect, recognize

the division

control between an attorney and the client he represents.
authority which the attorney has is conferred
client.

of
Any

upon him by the

Such authority is further limited by the attorney f s

ethical obligation to consult with and follow the directions of
the client with

regard to substantive

rights of the client.

While a retained attorney is clothed with apparent authority to
resolve certain ancillary and procedural matters with regards to

litigation matters, such retention does not empower the attorney
to

"impair

the

client's

substantial

Womancare, Inc., 696 P.2d 645, 650 (Cal.

rights".
1985).

Blanton

v.

For example, an

attorney may not stipulate to a matter which would eliminate an
essential defense, agree to the entry of a default judgment,
stipulate that only

nominal

damages may be awarded, waive

findings so that no appeal can be made, etc. without first
consulting with his client and allowing the latter to make the
final choice.

Id. (citations omitted.)

Such decisions differ

from the routine and tactical

decisions which have been called "procedural" both in the degree
to which they affect the client's interest, and in the degree to
v/hich they involve matters of judgment which extend beyond
technical competence so that any client would be expected to
share in the making of them.
Nevertheless, an attorney acts as assistant
client, and not as a master.

for his

The language and spirit of the

Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as Article 1,
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution speak of legal counsel as an
aid to a willing defendant, like other defense tools, and not an
organ of the state interposed between an unwilling defendant and
his constitutional rights.
1981)

citing

State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 17, 91

to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.

S.Ct. 2525, 2533, 45 L.Fd.2d 562 (1975).

806,

(Utah

820, 95

To compel one charged

with grievous crimes to undergo a trial with the assistance of an
attorney with whom he has become embroiled in irreconcilable
conflict is to deprive him of the effective assistance of any
counsel

whatsoever.

Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166,

1170

(9th

Cir. 1970) cited in State v. Wood, supra at 92.
In determining whether a conviction should be reversed
on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, the following
criteria must be established by an appellant before the Utah
Supreme

Court:

(1) A

demonstrable

reality

of

inadequate

representation, as opposed to a speculative matter; (2) The error
assigned was not simply the lawyerfs legitimate exercise of
choi'ce in trial strategy; (3) The deficiency in performance of
counsel was prejudicial, and without the error a different
verdict
203,

would likely have resulted.

State v. McNicol, 554

204 (Utah 1976) cited in Codianna v. Morris 660

P.2d

P.2d
1101

(Utah 1983) .
This Court has examined such a claim with regard to the
failure of defense counsel to request certain jury instructions
in the Codianna case.

In that case, the court required that the

instruction, if given, would have likely resulted in a different
verdict.

Failure to request a pertinent instruction could be

evidence of faulty performance by counsel where evidentiary
support for the instruction was compelling.
660 P.2d at 1113.
brief, the Court

Codianna v.

Morris,

As set forth more fully in point four of this
failed

to give

a lesser

included

jury

instruction on simple assault and burglary.

Furthermore counsel

for the Defendant failed to request such instruction dispite the
evidentiary support for the same.

Had the instruction been

given, a different verdict would have been the likely result.
The Defendant

forsaw that the alleged

impropriety

between his son and an older woman would be an issue in the case.
He testified about it and it was addressed on rebuttal.
became an issue in the closing

arguments of counsel.

It
The

defendant wanted witnesses called on the subject but his counsel
refused.

Mr. Speerfs credibility became a key element of the

case, and the inability of his defense counsel to address the
issue by calling the desired witnesses was prejudicial to the
Defendant.
Mr. Speer was originally charged in two cases.

The

instant case and a less serious matter in which the defendant was
charged with having entered the home of the victim and destroyed
her clothing.

The less serious matter was set first and would

have been resolved before the trial in this case had it not been
continued.

No hearing before the court was held. According to

the affidavit of the prosecutor the case was continued by mutual
agreement of counsel because they felt the trial in the instant
matter would be dispositive of that charge.
205-06.)

(Record on Appeal at

While this may well be true, counsel had no authority

to make that decision without the permission of his client. It

may have saved a trial, but it may also have injured the client.
As it turned outf the incident involving the destruction of the
clothing became an important part of the trial that was allowed
over the objection of the defense to show whether the defendant
was welcome in the home or not.
The attitude of counsel with respect to decision making
in the conduct of the case is further illustrated by the motion
to withdraw following trial.

In his final pleading of the case

Mr. VanSciver cites as a reason for the withdrawal the defendants
interference with his "unfettered discretion".

(Record on Appeal

at 209.)
Each of the foregoing instances demonstrates a reality
of inadequate representation by trial counsel for the Defendant.
The failure of counsel to request a specific jury instruction on
a lesser included offense, refusal to call crucial witnesses, and
entering into stipulations affecting the substantive rights of
the Defendant without his consent all constitute instances of
inadequate representation.

The Defendant and his counsel were

consistently at odds as to the conduct of his defense.

While

counsel is granted leeway in the conduct of his trial strategy,
the consistent

disregard

of Mr. Speerfs

concerns took

representation beyond mere exercise in trial strategy.

the

Finally,

without these errors, a different verdict would likely have
resulted.

The result of a lesser included jury instruction alone

could likely have resulted in a different verdict.

Consequently, the

record evinces

all

three

criteria

which must be established by an appellant in order to obtain a
reversal on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.
IV.

THE COURT FAILED TO GIVE A LESSER INCLUDED JURY
INSTRUCTION ON SIMPLE ASSAULT AND BURGLARY
Under section 77-35-21 (e) of Utah Code Ann. (1953) a

jury may return a verdict of guilty for the offense charged or
for any offense necessarily included in the offense charged.
Likewise, section 76-1-402(5) provides:
If the district court on motion after verdict
or judgment, or an appellate court on appeal
or certiorari, shall determine that there is
insufficient evidence to support a conviction
for the offense charged but that there is
sufficient evidence to support a conviction
for an included offense and the trier of fact
necessarily found every fact required for
conviction of that included offense, the
verdict or judgment of conviction may be set
aside or reversed and a judgment of
conviction entered for the included offense,
without necessity of a new trial, if such
relief is sought by the defendant.
This requirement of a necessarily included offense
being included in the charged offense is made for the protection
of

the defendant.

United States v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314, 320

(D.C.Cir. 1971), cited in State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 155 (Utah
1983).

By having the jury instructed regarding a lesser included

offense, the defendant is afforded the full benefit of the
reasonable

doubt

standard.

Keeble v. United States,

412

U.S.

205, 212-13, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1997-98, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973) cited

in State v. Baker, 671 P.2d at 157. Where one of the elements of
the offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is
plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its
doubts in favor of conviction. Id. Thus, the inclusion of a
lesser included offense provides the jury with a "third option" the

choice

of conviction

of a lesser

offense

rather

than

conviction of the greater offense or acquittal - and gives the
defendant a fuller benefit from the reasonable doubt standard.
State v. Baker, 671 P.2d at 157.
The Utah Code provides that a trial Court shall not be
obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense
unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the
included offense.

Section 76-1-402(4) Utah Code Ann. (1953).

Section 76-1-402(3)(a) defines "included offense" as, among other
things, an offense which is established by proof of the same or
less than all of the facts required to establish the commission
of the offense charged.

Assault is therefore definitionally an

included offense in Aggravated Assault, Sections 76-5-102, -103,
Utah Code Ann. (1953) , and Burglary is an included offense in
Aggravated Burglary, Sections 76-6-202, - 203, Utah Code Ann.
(1953) .
The

standard

for

a lesser

included

offense

jury

instruction at the request of a criminal defendant, as applied to
the immediate

case, requires

an evidentiary

basis

for the

acquittal on the more serious charge and a conviction on the
lesser charge.

This analysis requires the appellate court to

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant;
it is not the appellate Court's role to weigh the evidence, but
to determine if the evidence offered would permit a jury to find
the defendant innocent of the harsher charge and guilty of the
lesser charge.
Put

State v. Oldroyd. 685 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah

another way,

evidence

as

1984).

"if there is rational evidence looking at

a whole that would put an element of the

crime

the
in

dispute the lesser included offense instruction should be given."

Id*
In the Oldroyd casef the evidence put in dispute the
defendant's intent in pointing an allegedly unloaded weapon at
the arresting officer.

Thus a conviction of aggravated assault

was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.
556.

Id. at

Likewise in the immediate case, the defendant's intent

in

brandishing a weapon in Mrs. Speer's home was placed in doubt.
Mr. Speer testified that his intent was to commit suicide - not
to threaten or harm his ex-wife.

Taking this evidence and

considering it in the light most favorable to the Defendant, one
of the key elements of an aggravated assault charge is in dispute
- the criminal intent.

Such dispute provides an evidentiary

basis for the Defendant's acquittal on the charge of aggravated
assault, and would also go towards conviction on the lesser

charge of simple assault.

Consequently, defendant was entitled to

the lesser included offense jury instruction.
Section 77-35-19(c) Utah Code Ann. provides that no
party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission
therefrom

unless

he objects

thereto

before

the

jury

is

instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and
the ground of his objection.

Notwithstanding a party's failure

to object, error may be assigned to instructions in order to
avoid a manifest injustice.
In the

immediate

case, defense

counsel

failed to

request a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of
simple assault.

This failure is assigned as an error on the part

of defense counsel in regards to the argument of ineffective
assistance of counsel set forth above.

Not withstanding defense

counsel's failure to offer such jury instruction or object to the
courts exclusion of such instruction, manifest and justice can be
avoided only by assigning error to the jury instructions for
failure to include such lesser included offense instruction.
V.

THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT IN HIS
CROSS EXAMINATION AND CLOSING ARGUMENT

Reversible error is found where there is a reasonable
likelihood

that an improper question by a prosecutor

in a

criminal case so prejudiced the jury that in its absence there
might
1322

have been a different result.

State V. Hodges,

517

(Utah 1974), cited in State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56

P.2d
(Utah

1982).

The analysis of such issue on appeal must necessarily

turn on the nature of the statements and their relationship to
the evidence introduced at trial.
36 (Utah

1984).

State v. Fisher, 680 P.2d

35,

Where there exists ample independent evidence

supporting the verdict rendered, then the purportedly prejudicial
statements of the prosecutor do not constitute sufficient cause
for reversible error. See Id* at 37 (analyzing prejudicial effect
of

prosecutorfs opening statement); State v. Fontana,

1042, 1048 (Utah

680

P.2d

1984).

Howeverf where a prosecutor has injected testimony
concerning the Defendant being implicated in other crimes, and
where it appears that the main purpose and effect was to disgrace
the defendant in the minds of the jury, then convictions have
been
(Utah

reversed

by this court.

State v. Hodges,

517

P. 2d

1974) citing State v. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P.2d

1322
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and State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 383 P.2d 407 (1963).
The following areas were raised by prosecution during
the course

of the trial.

Despite the objections of the

Defendant, these matters were allowed into evidence.

The

Prosecution here explored, over the objection of the Defendant, a
separate matter which was charged but not resolved in another
case.

This incident involved alleged criminal conduct directed

toward the victim in December preceding this incident.
29.

Tr. 22-

The Prosecution also explored an alleged conversation
between the Defendant and one Jeanie Hessling that also occurred
in December,

This conversation

involved the issue of the

defendant's belief that the parties1 son was having an affair
with Ms. Hessling, a substantially older woman. Tr. 29-33, 52-56.
This was offered
defendant's

only

for

reputation,

overreactive.

to

the purpose
make

him

of attacking

look

threatening

the
and

It is noteworthy that Ms. Hessling was never

called to testify.
The

Prosecution

brought

up the personal

living

arrangements of the Defendant to show he was living with another
woman, although not divorced from the victim. Tr. 42-43.
And as indicated above, he accused the Defendant of
having abused his children. Tr.47-49.
The attack on the defendant was further compounded by
the actions of the prosecutor during closing argument where he
misstated the law

with respect to the charge of assault.

During

his closing argument the prosecutor argued that no serious
physical injury need be caused or attempted so long as any
physical

injury

which

he defined

as any

discomfort" caused by another. Transcript

"impairment

or

of closing argument

page 11-12.
The entire line of pursuit was designed to attack the
Defendant, disgrace him before the jury, and make him look like a
person more capable of committing the crime charged.

It was not

directed at his credibility, but at his reputation and

character

which was an improper subject of pursuit and should have been
prohibited.

State v. Hodges, 517 P.2d 1322.

VI. THE COURT ERRED IN CHARGING THE JURY THAT
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT COULD BE FOUND ON THE
BASIS OF RECKLESS CONDUCT
A person commits aggravated assault if he commits
assault as defined in section 76-5-102, Utah Code Ann. (1953) and
he intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another, or he
uses a deadly weapon or such means or force likely to produce
death or serious bodily injury.

Section 76-5-103, Utah Code Ann,

(1953) (emphasis added).
A personfs conduct is "intentional" where he acts with
intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or
to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. By contrast,
a person engages in conduct "recklessly" when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the circumstances exist or the result will occur.

The risk must

be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person
would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the
actor's standpoint.

Section 76-2-103, Utah Code Ann. (1953).

To support a conviction under Section 76-5-103(1) (a) , the state
must prove the accused intentionally caused

serious bodily

injury, viz., that he had a specific intent to inflict serious
bodily injury on the victim, and such injuries were, in fact,
caused

by

the assault.

P.2d 742, 744 (Utah

State in Interest of

1977).

Besendorfer,

568

Where the evidence of such specific

intent is lacking, and the victim sustained no serious bodily
injury, then the defendants conviction for aggravated assault
will

be

reversed. Id.

See also State v. Peck,

542

P.2d

1084

(Utah 1975).
Subsection

n

b" of

section

76-5-103, by contrast,

requires a general intent; i.e. an awareness of what is done as
opposed to requiring a specific intent to cause a certain harm or
event.

State

v. Howell, 554 P.2d 1326, 1328 (Utah 1976),

cited

in Besendorfer, supra at 744.
The evidence in the Record on Appeal establishes that
the Defendant had with him a shotgun.

However, the evidence

does not establish that Mr. Speer threatened Mrs. Speer with the
gun or in any way used it to assault her.

Rather, it became

apparent under the evidence that Mr. Speer intended to use the
shotgun for a suicide attempt.

Consequently, no deadly weapon or

such means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily
injury were involved in Mr. Speer's assault on his estranged
wife.
Had Mr. Speer utilized a deadly weapon or force upon
his wife, then the standard of general intent would have implied
to his offense.

However, such was not the case, and the only

applicable standard was that of section 76-5-102 (a), specific
intent.
The trial court instructed the jury that it could
convict the Defendant of aggravated assault if it found his
conduct

to have

been

reckless.

As set forth

above, such

instruction was erroneous and prejudiced the Defendants case.
The evidence of specific intent on the Defendant's part was
lacking from the record, and Mrs. Speer sustained no serious
bodily injury.

Consequentlyr the Defendant's conviction for

aggravated assault should be reversed.
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ENHANCED THE SENTENCE OF THE DEFENDANT
WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE TO THE DEFENDANT. '
At the time of the sentencing, the Court enhanced the
sentence of the Defendant by one year in accordance with U.C.A.
76-3-203.

The

information

contained

no

reference

to the

enhancement potential, no special finding was made by the jury
with respect to the use of a firearm, nor was the defendant given
any notice that such a finding was under consideration by the
judge until he had actually enhanced the sentence.
Fundamental

due process as guaranteed by the 14th

amendment to the Constitution of the United States requires that
a defendant have reasonable notice of the charges against him and
reasonable opportunity to defend against such charges.

This

includes the opportunity to defend against additional findings
that may result in increase of the sentence.

The Defendant cannot properly contest potential charges
of which he has not been advised.

He should not be subjected to

this enhancement where he was given no fair opportunity to meet
the charge prior to the Court's finding.
This Court has determined that the Defendant must be
put on notice of the potential use of the enhancement statute,
either

by

its being

plead

in the Information

or by the

Information's inclusion of a charge that a firearm was used in
the commission of the crime. State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (1978).
This

requirement

for

notice

is

further

aggravated

in

circumstances where the alleged conduct may or may not have
involved the use of a firearm depending on the focus of the jury.
In such a circumstance, unless the information presented to the
Jury is clear in its contents of a firearm as an element of the
crime, or the jury is asked to make such a finding, the trial
judge should not go behind the jury verdict and make a finding
that may be contrary to the jury finding.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Defendant's conviction should be reversed and the
matter remanded to the District Court for hearing before the
assigned trial judge.
At the retrial, the Prosecution should be prohibited
from trying cases other than the one before the bar and not be

allowed to delve into alleged bad conduct of the Defendant
unrelated to the charges in the information.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this
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day of June, 1986.
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SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

ARTICLE 1 SECTION 12 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, to have comnpulsory process to compel the attendance
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense
is alleged to have been committted, and the right to appeal in
all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the
rights herein guaranteed* The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testiify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953)
SECTION 76-1-402(3)(a)
A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the
offense charged but may not be convicted of both
the offense
charged and the included offense.
An offense is so includedd
when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all
the facts required to establish the commission of the offense
charged,
SECTION 76-1-402(4)
The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with
respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis
for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting him of the included offense.
SECTION 76-1-402(5)
If the district court on motion after verdict of judgment,
or an appellate court on appeal of certiorari, shall determine
that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for
the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to
support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of
fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that
included offense, the verdict of judgment of conviction may be
set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for
the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such
relief is sought by the defendant.

SECTION 76-5-102
(1) Assault is:
(a) An attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another; or
(b) A threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force
or violence , to do bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.

SECTION 76-5-103

(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits
assault as defined in section 76-5-102 and:
(a) He intentionally causes serious bodily injury to
another; or
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such means or force
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) Aggravated assault is a felony of the third degree.

SECTION 76-6-202
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent
to commit a felony of theft or commit an assault on any person,
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was
committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the
second degree.
SECTION 76-6-203
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in
attempting, committing, or fleeing from a burglary, the actor or
another participant in the crime:
(a) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a
participant in the crime; or
(b) Uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous
of deadly weapon against any person who is not a participant in
the crime; or
(c) Is armed wih a deadly weapon or possesses or
attempts to use any explosive or deadly weapon.
(2) Aggravated burglary is a felony of the first degree.
SECTION 77-35-19(c),
Instructions

RULE

19 OF

CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE

-

Jury

Mo party may assign as error any portion of the charge or
omission therefrom unles he objects thereto before the jury is
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and
the ground of his objection.
Notwithstanding a party's failure
to object, error may be assigned to instructions in order to
avoid a manifest injustice.

SECTION 77-35-2KE), RULE 21 OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - Verdict
The jury may return a verdict of guilty to the offense
charged or to any offense necessarily included in the offense
charged or an attempt to commit either the offense charged or an
offense necessarily included therein.
SECTION 78-51-26(9), JUDICIAL CODE - Duties of Attorneys and
Counselors
It is the duty of an attorney and counselor . . .
(9) to comply with all duly approved rules and regulations
prescribed by the board of commissioners of the Utah state bar
and to pay the fees provided by law.

LOCAL

RULE OF PRACTICE 3,4 IN THE DISTRICT COURTS
AND CIRCUIT COURTS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

(a)
All motions for continuance of trail or hearing shall
be made orally in open court or in writing, and shall state the
reasons therefore together with proof that notice of the motions
has been duly served upon the the adverse party. Notice of all
continuances must be given to the defendant.
Notice of a
continuance may be given in person, by telephone, or by mail.
The manner in which notice was effected shall be set fortth in
the file.
(b) Criminal cases that have been set for trial or hearing
shall not be continued or reassigned except upon order of the
court.

DISCIPLINARY RULE 7-101 - Representing a Client Zealously
(A)

A lawyer shall not intentionally:
(1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client
through reasonably available means permitted by law and the
Disciplinary Rules, except as provided by DR 7 - 1 0 K B ) . A lciwyer
does not violate this Disciplinary Rule, however, by acceding to
reasonable requests of opposing counsel which do not prejudice
the rights of his client, by being punctual in fulfilling all
professional commitments, by avoiding offensive tactics, or by
treating with courtesy and consideration all persons involved in
the legal process.
(2) Fail to carry out a contract of employment entered
into with a client for professional services, but he may withdraw
as permitted under DR 2-110, DR 5-102, and DR 5-105.
(3)
Prejudice or damage his client during the course
of the professional relationship except as required under DR 7102(B).
(B) In his representation of a client, a lawyer may:
(1) Where permissible, exercise his professional
judgment to waive or fail to assert a right or posittion of his
cliient.
(2)
Refuse to aid or participate in conduct that he
believes to be unlawful, even though there is some support for an
argument that the conduct is legal.

